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Abstract
The authors (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, Review of Economic Studies, 2014) claimed a conclusion
that the treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit
weak or no cycles. After correct two mathematical mistakes in their cycles tripwire algorithm, we research
the cycles by scanning the tripwire in the full strategy space of the games and we find significant cycles
missed by the authors. So we suggest that, all of the treatments exhibit significant cycles.
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The existence of cycles in mixed equilibrium games is a cutting edge question in the field crossing game
theory [1] and evolutionary game theory [2] for decades. The finding of cycles’s existences by quantitative
measurement in controlled experiments reported by Cason, Friedman and Hopkins [3] is a milestone-like
contribution in the field. But one of the conclusions in their article attracts our attention.
In their article [3], they claimed that control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete
time) replicate previous results that exhibit “weak or no cycles”. This depended on the results ——
The stable discrete time treatments (SD) do not exhibit clear cyclical behavior indicated by CRI’s not
significantly different from 0 (see their Table 3).
Two mathematical mistakes in the measurement algorithm were found when we checked their results
above.1 We corrected the mistakes (see Appendix). Using the refined measurement, if setting the start
point (α, β) of the tripwire for counting cycles (see Fig. ??) at ( 14 ,
1
4 ) —— Nash equilibrim (NE) of the
games as [3], CRI of SD will still not be significantly different from 0 (see up panel in Table 1 comparing
with their Table 3). So, for SD, we agree that, there are only weak or no cycles around NE.
However, if we set (α, β) at (0.23, 0.26) for SD-Mixed and at (0.22, 0.40) for SD-Pure, using the CRI
measurement as criterion still,2 we can find, both CRI of SD are significantly different from 0 which
indicates cycles’ existence (see low panel in Table 1).
Meanwhile, if using the accumulated counting number of cycles C as index (see the Eq.(2) in [4] for
detail explanation) instead of CRI, we also find that all C¯ (of the experimental blocks) for the treatments
are significantly different from 0 (see Table 2). This, again, indicates the cycles’ existence.
So, for SD, we suspect that their conclusion of “weak or no cycle”. We suggest that the treatments
(using simultaneous matching in discrete time) exhibit significant cycles instead of “weak or no cycles”.3
1We thank the authors’ [3] confirmation on this point during ESA-NA (2014) Conference.
2 Our pilot results suggest that using angular motion of the transits (e.g. the θ in Eq.(10) in [4]) are efficient observation
for cycles too. We wish to return to these future.
3We would like to point out follows. (1) The α, β for the two SD is close to the actual mean observation of the aggregated
social strategy which seems to tell us that, cycles are actually rounding actual mean observation instead of NE. (2) Their
treatments of RPS games are economical because only 6 groups of 8 subjects and 15 minutes are needed. If cycle could be
obtained, such treatments could be exemplified classroom experiments for teaching evolutionary game theory.
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Game Condition (α, β) Counter-Clock Clockwise Rotation p-value
-wise Transits Transits Index (CRI)
S Continuous-Instant ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 25.2 5.5 0.65* 0.028
S Continuous-Slow ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 9.4 0.8 0.87* 0.027
S Discrete-Mixed (SD-Mixed) ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 2.3 1.2 0.38 0.116
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 1.0 1.0 0.13 0.753
Ua Continuous-Instant (
1
4
, 1
4
) 31.9 0.9 0.94* 0.027
Ua Continuous-Slow (
1
4
, 1
4
) 8.2 0.0 1.00* 0.014
Ua Discrete-Mixed (
1
4
, 1
4
) 2.3 0.2 0.79* 0.027
Ua Discrete-Pure (
1
4
, 1
4
) 1.9 0.3 0.79* 0.027
Ub Continuous-Slow (
1
4
, 1
4
) 0.3 8.5 -0.93* 0.028
S Discrete-Mixed (SD-Mixed) (0.23, 0.26) 2.3 1.1 0.41* 0.035
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) (0.22, 0.40) 4.1 3.3 0.14* 0.028
Table 1 Mean Transits and CRI (Update the Table 3 in [3] with Refined Measurement).
*Denotes CRI Index significantly (p-value < 5%) different from 0 according to 2-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Game Condition (α, β) B1
† B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 C¯ ‡ p-value
S Continuous-Instant ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 128 53 120 74 58 157 98.3* 0.028
S Continuous-Slow ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 49 47 45 55 24 38 43.0* 0.028
S Discrete-Mixed (SD-Mixed) (0.23, 0.26) 3 0 3 2 9 18 5.8* 0.035
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) (0.22, 0.40) 6 4 2 4 8 1 4.2* 0.027
Ua Continuous-Instant (
1
4
, 1
4
) 158 114 218 195 175 70 155.0* 0.028
Ua Continuous-Slow (
1
4
, 1
4
) 45 53 48 39 28 34 41.2* 0.028
Ua Discrete-Mixed (
1
4
, 1
4
) 9 16 10 6 6 17 10.7* 0.027
Ua Discrete-Pure (
1
4
, 1
4
) 5 11.5 1.5 13 5.5 11 7.9* 0.028
Ua Discrete-Pure (
1
4
, 1
4
) -52 -29 -43 -49 -40 -33 -41.0* 0.028
Table 2: The accumulated counting number of cycles (C) in each block. † B indicates block, number
1 ∼ 6 indicates the block number in the related treatment. ‡ C¯ indicates the mean accumulated counting
number of cycles of an experimental block. *Denotes C index significantly (p-value < 5%) different from 0
according to 2-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Appendix
CRI was defined as [3] CRI=CCT−CTCCT+CT , and CCT and CT can be interpreted as follows. Supposing the
Poincare section (“tripwire”) is the segment between Pc:≡(α, β) as shown in Fig. A1 and Pe=(α, 0), and
a transit is a directional segment from state (x1, y1) observed at t to state (x2, y2). These two segments
could cross at X as
X :≡ (Xx, Xy) =
(
α, y1 +
(y2 − y1)(α− x1)
x2 − x1
)
. (1)
Accordingly, CCT =
∑
Ct>0
Ct and CT =
∑
Ct<0
|Ct| in which the Ct value of the transit (at time t)
should be 4
Condition 1 Ct = 0 if X 6∈ (Pc, Pe] ∪ x2 = x1
Condition 2 Ct = 1 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 > α > x1
Ct = −1 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 < α < x1
Condition 3 Ct =
1
2 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 > x1 ∩ (x1 = α ∪ x2 = α)
Ct = − 12 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 < x1 ∩ (x1 = α ∪ x2 = α)
At the same time, the accumulated counting number of cycles is C:=
∑
Ct (exactly the same as Eq.(2)
in [4]). According to [4], when C serves as an index, the criterion for cycles existence is that: if C is
4For a careful description for this measurement, see the Eq.(2) for the accumulated counting number C for cycles in [4].
We thank the authors’ [3] confirmation on this point.
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Figure A1: Illustration of the tripwire for cycles counting (Poincare section) [3]. A tripwire for cycles
counting is a line segment constructed between the reference point (α, β) and the simplex edge, as the vertical
dashed line extending below the point (α, β). The right tripwire is set as the reference point (α, β)=(0.82, 0.10).
The authors [3] set (α, β) = ( 1
4
, 1
4
) (the Nash equilibrium), used the tripwire (middle) and observed weak and no
cycles for stable discrete time treatments (SD). The arrow indicates a transit from (x1, y1) to (x2, y2) crossing the
left tripwire at C.
significantly different from 0, cycles exist; alternatively, no cycle.
There are two mathematical mistakes in the measurement algorithm (see Result 3.do in their paper’s
supplement). Mistake-1: For Condition 2, a necessary condition for Ct = ±1 were set as y1+y22 < β
without Eq.(1). Mistake-2: For Condition 3, Ct were set as 0.
Game Algorithm Index Mean
Condition (α, β) refined chosed Index p-value
(before/after) CRI/C value
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) (0.22, 0.40) before CRI 0.07 0.173
(0.22, 0.40) after CRI 0.14* 0.028
(0.22, 0.40) before C 2.17 0.113
(0.22, 0.40) after C 4.2* 0.027
Table A1: Explanation of the Necessary of the Correction for the Measurement Algorithm.
*Denotes CRI Index significantly (p-value < 5%) different from 0 according to 2-tailed Wilcoxon test.
These mistakes need to be corrected. Table A1 exhibits both results, without algorithm refined and
with algorithm refined. Obviously, without refined algorithm we cannot find cycles even if we set (α, β)
at (0.22, 0.40). On contrary, with the refined algorithm, the existence of cycles can be verify by both
CRI and C. This comparison implies that the algorithm correction is necessary.
Programs for the replication of the results in this paper are provided as supplements.
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